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1.  Introduction
According to Hoyt Cleveland Tillman, “The fundamental question of Sung Neo-
Confucians was an ethical one: how to get a moral individual!  This quest led them 
into metaphysical speculation about the substance of the Tao and the cosmic ground 
for the inner nature of the individual.”1)  Having the same problematik as the Song Chi-
na Neo-Confucians, the Choso˘n Korea Neo-Confucians, however, in particular delved 
into human feelings (情) and tried to justify the origin of good feelings (善) within li-qi
binary theory (理氣論, principle and material force).  This was the beginning of the 
Four Seven Debate (四端七情論, sadan ch’iljo˘ngnon).  It also can be said to be the dis-
tinctively Korean development of Neo-Confucian li-qi theory.
Since Takahashi To¯ru (1878–1967), in his 1929 article “The Development of the Li -
principle Faction and the Qi -principle Faction in Choso˘n Confucian History,”2) re-
garded the Four Seven Debate as the hard core of Choso˘n Confucianism and classiﬁed 
Choso˘n Neo-Confucianism into three factions, that is, li -principle (主理), qi -principle 
(主氣), and compromise (折衷),3) nearly all scholars of Korean Confucian philosophy4)
agree that Korean Confucian philosophy began with the Four Seven Debate.5)  For ex-
ample, Yi Sang-uˇn wrote, “In the development of Korean Confucian theory, the prob-
lem of the Four Beginnings6) which was aroused in the li-qi theory between T’oegye 退
溪 (Yi Hwang, 1501–1570) and Kobong 高峰 (Ki Taesuˇng, 1527–1572) could be a wa-
tershed.  This is the Four Seven Debate……  Since this debate affects the foundation 
of Korean philosophy, it is a problem for all the Korean philosophers that they should 
ﬁnd some connections with the thought of modern philosophy.”7)  Pae Chong-ho 
writes, “Generally speaking, the essence of Korean Neo-Confucianism is characterized 
as having two tendencies, li principle and qi principle … which were caused by the 
Four Seven Debate.”8)  Park Chong-hong also states, “Korean Neo-Confucianism can 
be characterized by the Four Seven Debate and inso˘ng mulso˘ngnon9) (人性物性論, a de-
bate of the sameness or difference about the nature of man and animal).”10)  It may be 
said therefore that the Four Seven Debate is an indispensable ﬁeld of study as regards 
the development of Neo-Confucianism in Choso˘n Korea.11)
The Four Seven Debate began between T’oegye and Kobong in 1559,12) and has 
come to be regarded as the most important philosophical debate in Choso˘n intellectu-
al history.  This debate is widely recognized as a profound theoretical debate on li-qi
theory.  The topic of the Four Seven Debate centers around questions regarding the 
nature of the human mind (心, sim)13) and how to justify moral nature (性).  This is evi-
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dent when one examines the meaning of Four Beginnings (四端) and Seven Feelings 
(七情).  In short, the Four Seven Debate concerns how to explain the human mind by 
means of li-qi binary theory.14)  According to Michael C. Kalton, “It discloses potenti-
alities and tensions in the Neo-Confucian vision as elaborated by Zhu Xi.”15)
The Four Seven Debate was foreshadowed in Zhu Xi’s li-qi theory.16)  Even though 
Zhu Xi’s theory was further elaborated by Choso˘n Neo-Confucian scholars who par-
ticipated in the debate, the issue was not clearly solved because their philosophical 
language was limited to Zhu Xi’s system.  T’oegye’s theory is a dualism of li and qi. 
He posited li as an independent dynamic entity in order to defend innate human mo-
rality while exploiting Zhu Xi’s words.  According to Youn Sa-soon (Yun Sa-sun), 
“T’oegye, in the Four Seven Debate, emphasized the issuance of principle: that is, he 
wanted to convince people of the propriety and spontaneity of one’s original nature 
which enable one to overcome the possible hindrance of material nature.”17)  For this 
reason T’oegye’s theory led to a strong dualism.  Kobong in turn criticized T’oegye’s 
li-qi dualism based on Zhu Xi’s “no dichotomy” (不可分開) between li and qi.
Yulgok 栗谷 (Yi I, 1536–1584) was in the same line with Kobong.  He criticized 
T’oegye’s li -issuance theory, asserting that “li is non-active, and qi is active; qi issues, 
and li mounts it” (氣發理乘).  In terms of the relations between tosim (道心, Tao mind) 
and insim (人心, human mind), he claimed that tosim can change into insim, or insim
can change into tosim, which might open another chapter in Choso˘n intellectual histo-
ry.  According to him, human morality does not depend on either nature or feelings, 
but instead is up to the will (意).  As a result, human feelings, which T’oegye once de-
spised, appear as a driving force thanks to the will.
2.  The Problems of the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings
The Four Beginnings were introduced by Mencius18) in order to support the argu-
ment that human nature is good.  If we examine the whole passage in Mencius where 
the Four Beginnings appears, the passage is divided into three parts as follows:
Mencius said, ‘All people have a mind/heart which cannot bear [to see the suf-
fering] others.  The ancient kings had this mind/heart which could not stand to 
see the suffering of others, and, with this, operated a government which could 
not stand to see the suffering of the people.  If, in this state of mind, you ran a 
government which could not endure people’s suffering, you could govern the 
realm as if you were turning it in the palm of your hand.  Why do I say all hu-
man beings have a mind/heart which cannot stand to see the suffering of others? 
Even nowadays, if an infant were about to fall into a well, anyone would be upset 
and concerned.  This concern would not be due to the fact that the person want-
ed to get in good with the baby’s parents, or because he wanted to improve his 
reputation among the community or among his/her circle of friends.  Nor would 
it be because he was afraid of the criticism that might result from a show of non-
concern.
‘From such a case, we see that a man without the feeling (mind, 心) of com-
miseration (惻隱) is not a man; a man without the feeling of shame and dislike 
(羞惡) is not a man; a man without the feeling of deference and compliance (辭
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讓) is not a man; and a man without the feeling of right and wrong (是非) is not a 
man.  The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of humanity (仁之端); the 
feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness (義之端); the feel-
ing of deference and compliance is the beginning of propriety (禮之端); the feel-
ing of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom (智之端).
‘People have these Four Beginnings just as they have their four limbs.  Having 
these Four Beginnings, but saying that you cannot act on them is to cheat your-
self.  To say that the ruler doesn’t have them is to cheat the ruler.  Since all peo-
ple have these Four Beginnings within themselves, they should all understand 
how to enhance and develop them.  It is like when a ﬁre just starts, or a spring 
ﬁrst bubbles out of the ground.  When you are able to fully develop [these Four 
Beginnings], you will be able to take care of all people within the four seas (the 
world).  If you don’t develop [them], you will not even be able to take care of 
your parents.’19)
First, we have to be aware that the subject of the entire argument is the human 
mind.20)  Second, the logical pattern proceeds to deduce the Four Beginnings after gen-
eralizing the example of “a child falling into a well.”  The argument then induces the 
Four Virtues from the Four Beginnings.  Third, even though the quotation is divided 
into three parts, most scholars have quoted exclusively the second part, which has 
caused them to ignore the logic of the passage.  Now we need to analyze the three 
parts of the quote to elucidate the argument of the Four Beginnings.
The ﬁrst part of the quotation includes the parable that has become very famous as 
representing the core of Confucianism.  The main idea of the parable can be seen in 
the ﬁrst proposition of the quotation: all people have a mind which cannot bear to see 
the suffering others.  This is a major premise of Confucianism, which results in the 
proposition that a human being has an innate goodness.  Mencius thus provides the 
parable in order to deduce the Four Minds (四心).  As a result, the second part begins 
with a detailed description of the Four Minds: the mind (or feeling) of commiseration 
(惻隱之心), the mind (or feeling) of shame and dislike (羞惡之心), the mind (or feel-
ing) of deference and compliance (辭讓之心), and the mind (or feeling) of right and 
wrong (是非之心).  Mencius, providing the example, intended to clarify the fact that 
these Four Minds play a role as the essential conditions for a human being to become 
a human being.  However, the problem lies in the next logical step.
According to Mencius, the Four Minds are the beginnings of humanity, righteous-
ness, propriety, and wisdom (仁義禮智).  That is to say, the predicates of the Four 
Minds are the beginnings, not the Four Virtues21)—humanity, righteousness, propri-
ety, and wisdom.  The Four Virtues are new concepts in this argument.  The begin-
ning is the translation of tan (端, in Chinese, duan), which literally means the begin-
ning/end of a piece of thread.  The Four Minds are the beginnings/ends of the Four 
Virtues.  The Four Minds are attributes of the Four Virtues, which indicates the impor-
tant point that the Four Virtues can only be inferred from the Four Minds.  Therefore, 
the Four Beginnings determine the Four Virtues; we can simply assume the Four Vir-
tues by the Beginnings.  Nevertheless, Mencius juxtaposes the Four Beginnings with 
the Four Virtues through the Beginnings until the end of the argument because Men-
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cius wanted to clarify the proposition that human nature is good by presenting the 
Four Virtues.  In the end though, Mencius is not talking about these Four Virtues, but 
only about the Four Beginnings.  The Four Virtues are the concepts induced from the 
Four Minds.  This conclusion eventually led to the philosophical debates found in 
Choso˘n intellectual history.
The third part of the quotation includes another important point in understanding 
the relationship between the mind and the Four Beginnings.  First, a human being has 
the Four Beginnings, just as he has four limbs.  Second, a human being should develop 
the Four Beginnings to their fullest extension.  In terms of the ﬁrst proposition, though, 
Mencius should have said, “Human beings have these Four Minds just as they have 
their four limbs.”  But he said, “Human beings have the Four Beginnings,” instead of 
the Four Minds.  This is because Mencius intended to emphasize the Four Virtues and 
not the Four Beginnings.  However, it might be awkward if he were to state “the Four 
Minds are the Four Virtues” mainly because the latter is induced from the former.  For 
this reason he required a connecting device between these two factors, which was the 
Beginnings.
Mencius wanted to show concrete moral values whereby human beings can behave 
like human beings.  What Mencius intended to say to the people of his time was that 
human beings should develop the Four Beginnings to their fullest extension: the Four 
Virtues.  In other words, human beings should develop the Four Beginnings with their 
own will because they are human beings.  Here, if we follow the logical pattern and 
restore the connecting devices to their original meaning, the proposition entails, “Hu-
man beings should develop the Four Minds to the fullest extension of the Four 
Minds.”  This cannot show concrete pictures of that to which human beings should as-
pire.  Thus Mencius presents the Four Virtues as concrete moral values.  With these 
virtues in mind people can ﬁnd the goal that they can reach with their own will.  How-
ever, this is not sufﬁcient as there is no account of “how to achieve this goal.”
In conclusion, the Four Beginnings in Mencius is an argument about human mind. 
Human beings have the Four Minds (feelings, 心) which are basic conditions to be-
coming a human being.  And since the Four Minds are the beginnings of the Four Vir-
tues, human beings should develop them to the fullest extension of the Four Virtues 
with their own will.
Now, let us turn to the Seven Feelings.  In Book of Rites we ﬁnd:
What are human feelings?  They are joy (憙), anger (怒), sorrow (哀), fear (懼), 
love (愛), hate (惡), and desire (欲), which human beings can feel without learn-
ing.  …  Therefore the sage controls the seven feelings and opens the ten righ-
teousnesses.22)
Among these feelings, I doubt whether desire can be described as one of the human 
feelings.  In addition, three of the feelings, fear, love, and hate, do not seem to be 
clearly separate from the preceding three feelings.  More importantly, it is doubtful 
whether we can describe the complexity of human feelings with these seven feelings 
alone.  However, since Choso˘n intellectuals regarded these seven feelings as human 
feelings in general, they used another description about human feelings in the Four 
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Seven debate.  These are seen in Doctrine of the Mean as follows:
Before the feelings of joy (喜), anger (怒), sorrow (哀), and pleasure (樂) are 
aroused it is called equilibrium (centrality, mean; in Chinese, zhong ).  When these 
feelings are aroused and each and all attain due measure and degree, it is called 
harmony.  Equilibrium is the great foundation of the world, and harmony its uni-
versal path.  When equilibrium and harmony are realized to the highest degree, 
Heaven and Earth will attain their proper order and all things will ﬂourish.23)
Although we cannot conﬁrm that the Four Feelings include the Seven Feelings found 
in Book of Rites, we do not have to differentiate between them if we try to talk about 
human feelings in general.  The intellectuals in Choso˘n Korea used the four feelings of 
Doctrine of the Mean, instead of those found in Book of Rites.  According to Kim Ki-hyo˘n, 
the Four Seven Debate was caused by identifying the Seven Feelings with the Four 
Feelings.  He continued, while the Seven Feelings in Book of Rites are illustrated as dan-
gerous and should be controlled by moral virtues, the Four Feelings are described as 
objective and comprehensive.  Even though according to him the feelings described in 
the two books are different, Choso˘n intellectuals identiﬁed them, which directly 
caused the Four Seven Debate.  For example, T’oegye came close to the Seven Feel-
ings of Book of Rites, whereas Kobong approaches the Four Feelings of Doctrine of the 
Mean.24)  Even though Kim tried to interpret the Four Seven Debate based on the fact 
that the connotations of the two feelings are mixed, it is difﬁcult to accept as it were 
because the Four Seven Debate concerns human feelings in general and their relations 
to nature (性).  Nevertheless, his interpretation provides a suitable point to understand 
the Four Seven Debate in terms of differentiating the feelings.  In line with this, Tu 
Wei-Ming differentiated the feelings from emotions.  He states, “A feeling person is 
sensitive and intuitive, an emotional person often yields to uncontrollable passions. 
Feeling can be a constant state, emotion is often short-lived.  In sum, we can feel (or 
sense) what is within us without expressing it but our emotions cannot but show upon 
our countenances.”25)  He concluded that the Four Beginnings are feelings, and the 
Seven Feelings are emotions, noting that the Chinese character qing (情) can be ren-
dered as feeling and emotion.26)  However, the Four Seven Debate can be said to con-
cern mainly emotions if we follow Tu Wei-ming’s deﬁnition.  It concerns how to pre-
scribe human emotions with the li-qi binary system, or how to prescribe human 
morality.  The debate seems moot.
3.  The Four Seven Debate: T’oegye
The Four Seven Debate was foreshadowed in 1553 when T’oegye advised Ch’uman 
Cho˘ng Chi-un (秋巒 鄭之雲, 1509–1561) to amend his “Diagram of the Heavenly 
Mandate” (天命圖, Ch’o˘nmyo˘ngdo).  Writing in detail, Cho˘ng stated in “Diagram,” “The 
Four Beginnings issue from li; the Seven Feelings issue from qi ” (四端發於理七情發於
氣).27)  He asked T’oegye whether this was correct, and in reply, T’oegye, quoting the 
passage from Zhu Xi, advised him to amend the passage as, “The Four Beginnings are 
the issuance of li; the Seven Feelings are the issuance of qi ” (四端理之發七情氣之
發).28)  T’oegye’s amendment resulted in the dynamism of li based on the bifurcation 
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of the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings.  Furthermore, it came to more clearly 
divide li and qi.  Kobong’s basic attitude toward T’oegye is based on this strong dual-
ism.  According to Zhu Xi, li and qi cannot be separate.
After Kobong’s criticism, T’oegye, in 1559, sent him a letter in which he amended 
his previous thought as follows:
The issuance of the Four Beginnings is purely a matter of principle (理) and 
therefore involves nothing but good; the issuance of the Seven Feelings includes 
material force (氣) and therefore involves both good and evil.29)
T’oegye could not give up the idea that li is pure and the origin of all human moral-
ity.  Fundamentally this position was caused by the major premise of Sung Neo-Con-
fucianism: so˘ng (性, nature) is the same as li.  Even though the Four Beginnings and the 
Seven Feelings issue from the human mind, T’oegye had to protect the sanctity of the 
Four Beginnings because they all originate from li.  More speciﬁcally, T’oegye thought 
that the original nature (本然之性) can and does ultimately overcome the obstacles 
caused by the emotional (or instinctive) needs of psychophysical nature (氣質之性).30)
However, Kobong did not cease attacking T’oegye’s idea.  T’oegye again amended his 
idea as follows:
The Four Beginnings are all good.  Therefore it is said, ‘Without these four dispo-
sitions, one is no longer human.’31)  And it is also said, ‘As for the feelings, it is 
possible for them to be good.’32)  In the case of the Seven Feelings, then, good 
and evil are not yet ﬁxed.33)
And he amended it yet again:
The Four Beginnings are all good.  Therefore, it is said, ‘Without these four dis-
positions, one is no longer human.’  And it is also said, ‘As for the feelings, it is 
possible for them to be good.’  In the case of the Seven Feelings, then, they are 
originally good but easily devolved into evil.  Therefore, when they issue with 
proper measure, they are called harmonious.  As soon as we have them but are 
not able to exercise discernment, then the mind-and-heart is already in the con-
dition of missing its proper condition.34)
T’oegye changed his conception of the Seven Feelings to be “good and evil are not yet 
ﬁxed” and “originally good but easily devolved into evil.”  T’oegye could not avoid 
this change in position because the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings are a 
problem of the mind (心).  That is to say, T’oegye must have recognized that the Four 
Seven Debate is a debate within the same realm of qi, namely, the mind, and he tried 
to protect the concept of li or so˘ng in the mind.  Therefore, Kobong’s argument, which 
is that the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings cannot be separated, is logically su-
perior to that of T’oegye.  Nevertheless, T’oegye could not relinquish his idea.  His 
ﬁnal conclusion is as follows:
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In the world, there is no qi without li; no li without qi.  As for the Four Begin-
nings, li issues and qi follows (理發氣隨); as for the Seven Feelings, qi issues and 
li mounts it (氣發理乘).  If qi does not follow li, li cannot issue; if li does not 
mount qi, [a human being] falls into [seeking] self-interest and selﬁsh desire to be-
come a brute.35)
T’oegye’s basic standpoint does not change.  Li and qi altogether issue respectively (理
氣互發).  More speciﬁcally, li is covered by qi like the yolk of an egg.  Accordingly, 
when li issues forth, it manifests through qi, which T’oegye describes as “qi ’s follow-
ing.”  On the other hand, when qi issues, it stimulates the inner li, which he describes 
as “li ’s mounting.”  The Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings all indicate the feel-
ings of the human being, which are composed of the combination of li and qi.  Al-
though the Four Beginnings are only good, they issue through qi.  Because the Seven 
Feelings contain not only evil but also good li can be said to involve itself in their issu-
ance of them.  As a result, T’oegye seemingly achieved his goal without contradicting 
that li and qi are different but not separate.36)
Youn Sa-soon argued that on a cosmological level T’oegye’s theory maintains the 
identiﬁcation of “what is so” (所以然) and “what should be so” (所當然).  According to 
him, “The law of ‘what is so’ is applicable when a thing can be formed necessarily (or 
naturally), while that of ‘what should be so’ is applicable when a thing is formed inten-
tionally.  So, a thing must be formed necessarily (naturally) and intentionally in order 
to satisfy the conditions of both these laws.  This is the condition under which the 
identiﬁcation of ‘what is so’ and ‘what should be so’ can actually be maintained. 
Therefore, in order to apply T’oegye’s theory to the whole universe, we should dem-
onstrate that the universe is formed in the same way an individual is formed.”37)  Youn 
continues to argue that this is only possible because T’oegye’s theory basically follows 
qi theory,38) writing, “Like Ch’eng-Chu, T’oegye thought that one of the characteristics 
of ki is its capacity for generation and destruction, and that the universe, as the aggre-
gation of ki, is a living entity, or a kind of ‘organism.’”39)  He points out the weak point 
of T’oegye’s theory in the following manner:
In the ﬁrst place, if the organic view of the universe is really founded on the basis 
of ki ’s being subject to generation and destruction, there should be a fundamen-
tal explanation of this characteristic in ki.  In this respect, though it may seem 
far-fetched, there should also be presented some theory of life itself.40)
The explanation of this characteristic of qi was the question of T’oegye’s theory that qi
principle scholars such as Hyegang (惠岡, 1803–1877) ultimately attempted to address.
The Four Seven Debate is mainly an argument about whether the human mind is 
good or evil.  T’oegye’s problematik lies in from where the feelings originate.  T’oegye’s 
ﬁnal conclusion yields ﬁve important points.  First, T’oegye tried to protect the poten-
tial for morality as already suggested in Mencius.  If li, as Zhu Xi wrote,41) does not 
have a creative power, li itself cannot project anything to human behaviors.  T’oegye 
could not allow this deﬁnition even though he was one of the followers of Zhu Xi.  Af-
ter his struggles in supporting his own idea, T’oegye ﬁnally found the appropriate sup-
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porting passage in Zhu Zi yulei (朱子語類, Classiﬁed Conversation of Zhu Zi), which 
states, “The Four Beginnings are the issuance (發) of li ; the Seven Feelings are the issu-
ance (發) of qi.”42)  In employing this passage, he achieved two goals.  He found the 
basis for asserting that li has a creative power as the origin of morality, and at the 
same time, he could escape from betraying Zhu Xi’s doctrine as he used Zhu Xi’s own 
passage.
Second, T’oegye showed an inclination towards regarding li as good, but qi as evil. 
As discussed above, in terms of feelings, T’oegye seems to follow the connotation of 
the Seven Feelings in Book of Rites.  Even though he changed his position as a result of 
Kobong’s attacks, his basic attitude remained unchanged.  This can be interpreted as 
T’oegye trying to grant a potential morality to human beings, in other words.  Despite 
his intention to establish morality, the scope became much wider because he asserted 
the superiority of li over qi.  It is quite difﬁcult to interpret human feelings with li and 
qi as seen in Zhu Xi’s own writings.  Conclusively, as T’oegye maintained that qi is 
evil, the physical world also became evil.  This is vastly different from Yulgok’s view. 
According to Ro Young-chan, “For Yulgok, neither principle nor material force has 
any intrinsic moral implication; rather, they are cosmological concepts that gain moral 
signiﬁcance when applied to human beings, since human beings are not free of a mor-
al dimension.”43)
Third, T’oegye’s theory of the mind does not clarify much in regards to the mind’s 
internal structure and function.  His account of the mind provides no description or 
explanation for other spiritual/mental abilities and processes, such as will or reason. 
Instead we ﬁnd such things in the writings of Hyegang.
Fourth, li in T’oegye’s theory becomes an independent dynamic entity and his li-qi
theory has a strong tendency towards an obvious dualism.  T’oegye’s theory can be 
said to be based on the major Neo-Confucian premise: so˘ng is the same as li.  If we re-
place li in T’oegye’s remarks with so˘ng, or human nature, the argument might become 
very simple.  However, from a cosmological point of view, the li issuance (理發) of 
T’oegye can be interpreted as “the issuance of an existential pattern or physical law (in 
Hyegang’s case),” which is an awkward way of describing the universe.  This position 
was criticized by Yulgok.
Lastly, T’oegye’s theory should solve the problem of the characteristics of ki in or-
der to complete his organic view of the universe because the identiﬁcation of “what is 
so” and “what should be so” is based on an organic ki theory.  We can ﬁnd this answer 
in Hyegang’s qi theory.
4.  The Four Seven Debate: Yulgok
The second round of the Four Seven Debate began between Yulgok and Ugye So˘ng 
Hon (牛溪 成渾, 1535–1598; Ugye is his pen name) who, in 1572, wrote a letter to 
Yulgok asserting that Zhu Xi’s differentiation between tosim and insim corresponds to 
T’oegye’s alternating issuance of li and qi.  In his preface to Doctrine of the Mean, Zhu 
Xi wrote, “The one (insim) arises from the selﬁshness of the physical constitution (形
氣), while the other (tosim) arises from the correctness of the conferred nature (性命).” 
T’oegye also wrote, “Insim indicates the Seven Feelings; tosim indicates the Four Begin-
nings.”44)
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Yulgok clariﬁed his position in his ﬁrst letter to Ugye as follows:
The mind is single; using [diverse] terms for it such as ‘tosim’ and ‘insim’ is a re-
sult of the distinction between our conferred nature (性命) and our physical con-
stitution (形氣).  The feelings are single; speaking of them in some cases as ‘the 
Four [Beginnings]’ and in others as ‘the Seven Feelings’ is due to the difference 
between speaking with exclusive reference to principle and speaking of it as 
combined with material force.  Thus insim and the tosim cannot be combined, but 
rather are related in the same fashion as end and beginning.  The Four Begin-
nings are not able to include the Seven Feelings, but the Seven Feelings include 
the Four Beginnings.45)
According to Yulgok, the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings are one because 
they are all human feelings; however, the Seven Feelings include the Four Beginnings 
because, while the Four Beginnings indicate good human feelings, the Seven Feelings 
are the comprehensive feelings of human beings.  Yulgok’s interpretation of the Four 
Seven Debate is basically identical with Kobong’s.  In terms of insim and tosim, they 
arise from our two different natures, however, the origin of both is the single mind. 
Depending on from where they issue, they have two different names, and, as a result, 
they cannot be combined.
Thus what is the relation between insim and tosim?  T’oegye early on divided and 
allotted them into the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings.  However, Yulgok 
could not follow T’oegye’s interpretation since the two minds are related in the same 
fashion as either beginning or ending.46)  He states:
Now, [the disposition of] man’s mind-and-heart (心) emerge directly from the 
correctness of the normative nature (性), but sometimes they are not able to con-
form to it and follow it out, but rather become interfused with selﬁsh intentions. 
When this happens, it is a case of beginning with the tosim and ending with insim. 
Or sometimes they emerge from the psychophysical constitution but do not di-
verge from correct principle; in this case, there is certainly no departure from the 
tosim.  Or sometimes they diverge from correct principle but recognize the mis-
take and become ordered and subdued and do not follow the selﬁsh desires. 
When this happens, it is a case of beginning with insim and ending with the 
tosim.47)
Here, Yulgok provides a groundbreaking interpretation of the two minds.  That is to 
say, tosim can change into insim, or insim can change into tosim.  This opens another 
chapter in Choso˘n intellectual history.  T’oegye maintained a dualistic standpoint re-
garding the mind of human beings, accepting that its components such as virtue and 
desire, good and evil, or moral reason (the Four Beginnings, tosim) and feelings (the 
Seven Feelings, insim) exist independently in the mind.  According to T’oegye’s logic, 
in order to protect the morality of human beings, this reasoning is extended to the cos-
mological view and resulted in his theory of the alternating issuance of li and qi.  How-
ever, when Yulgok essentially broke down the barrier between the two minds, sud-
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denly the morality of human beings, as asserted by T’oegye, became vulnerable, if not 
questionable.
However, according to Yulgok’s theory was it still possible to protect the morality 
of human beings?  He wrote, “Insim and tosim refer inclusively to both the feelings and 
will; they do not refer only to the feelings.”48)  Yulgok emphasized another mental 
ability of human beings and thereby settled the problem.  He wrote:
In general, the condition before [the mind-and-heart] is aroused is the nature; af-
ter it is aroused, it is feelings.  When it is aroused and engages in consideration 
and calculation, it is will.  The mind-and-heart is the master of the nature, feel-
ings (情), and will.  Therefore the conditions of being not yet aroused, already 
aroused, and exercising calculation can all be referred to as the mind-and-
heart.49)
Here we ﬁnd a particular deﬁnition of the mind of human beings.  The mind has three 
conditions: nature, feelings, and will.  According to Yulgok, the will is based on logical 
judgment or logical reason.  Human morality does not depend on either nature or 
feelings, but instead is up to the will.  Feelings cannot be said to have a partial value 
whether good or evil, but they possess both good and evil.  It is the will that controls 
the feelings.  Therefore insim, by way of the will, can change into tosim.  As he empha-
sizes the importance of the will, the status of the mind of human beings becomes wid-
er in its scope.  Now human feelings, which T’oegye once despised, appear as a driv-
ing force thanks to the will.
However, Yulgok’s insim-tosim theory has a tendency towards subjectivism.  Han 
Hyo˘ng-jo, in “Yulgok’s Plan of Self-Cultivation,” points out,
The center of this moral cultivation is the mind-and-heart.  It controls the process 
of human response from potential energy to actual issuance, to check the devi-
ance and modify it properly.  In the course of Yulgok’s argument, he never in-
vestigates the possibility of falling into an uncertain result.  After all, if the criteria 
can be left to individual awareness, though metaphysically its objectivity is en-
sured by Heaven, in a concrete situation it will easily be contaminated by the ar-
bitrariness of a subject.50)
That is to say, Yulgok’s theory possibly lacks objectivity while T’oegye persisted in the 
dualistic standpoint which regardless would be able to secure objectivity.51)  This prob-
lem can be partly solved by Tasan Cho˘ng Yag-yong’s (茶山 丁若鏞, 1762–1836; Tasan 
is his pen name) kwo˘nhyo˘ng (權衡, to weigh and compare) theory, but Hyegang’s 
ch’uch’uˇk (to investigate and infer) theory can provide a direct answer to this problem 
because ch’uch’uˇk theory naturally encompasses the veriﬁcation (證驗) process.
Yulgok’s view on the Four Seven Debate and insim-tosim is based on his li-qi theory. 
Yulgok asserts that li is universal and qi is particular (理通氣局), and particularly em-
phasizes that original qi (本然之氣) is one and clear and pure.  He wrote:
[Li ] relies upon the process ﬂux (流行) of qi, uneven as this may be.  Its original 
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excellence is everywhere, unlimited by the partiality of qi.  And yet, it also takes 
the lead of qi as a particularizing [principle].  What is particular is due to qi, not 
li.  When qi is complete, so, too, is li.  What is complete is qi, not li.  Li is every-
where present, even in dregs, ashes, excrement, and dirt.  It is the reason for 
each having its own nature.  Yet li suffers no injury in its original excellence. 
This is what is meant by li being universal (理通).  But what is the meaning of qi
being particular (氣局)?  Qi is the visible and has its beginning and end, with 
something prior to it, and something posterior.  Qi is originally one and clear and 
pure.  How can we speak [in this ﬁrst instance] of the qi of … dregs and excre-
ment and dirt?  But since it moves without cease, ascending and descending, it 
becomes uneven and produces myriad changes.  [And such things come about] 
… as clear qi, which is different from turbid qi, and even the qi of … dregs and 
excrement and dirt.52)
Even though Yulgok accepts that li is universal, but he emphasizes that qi is originally 
pure and clear.  After qi issues and produces myriad things, it becomes turbid.  This 
view explains why Yulgok rejects T’oegye’s li issuance and his partial judgment on 
insim.  The good feelings and bad feelings are issued by the original qi, and insim and 
tosim are also issued by the original qi.  Whether its issuance accords to li determines 
either insim or tosim.53)
However, Yulgok does not contradict Zhu Xi.  Rather he seems to be a loyal fol-
lower of Zhu Xi.  In terms of li and qi, he wrote:
Generally speaking, that which gives issuance (發之者) is material force; that 
whereby there is issuance (所以發者) is principle.  Without material force, there 
would not be the power of issuing; without principle, there would not be that 
whereby it issues.  (Even though a sage should be born again, the words from 
‘that which gives issuance’ (發之) could not be changed.)54)
Qi plays an active role and li assures the basis from which qi issues forth.  This seems 
to follow Zhu Xi’s li-qi binary theory, but the connotation is quite different.  Song 
Neo-Confucians (particularly the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi) tried to introduce li into 
the Chinese intellectual discourse and for this reason Zhu Xi also needed to empha-
size li rather than qi.55)  However, Yulgok intended to control the overpowering li. 
T’oegye took the li part from Zhu Xi’s li-qi theory and emphasized it to its extreme. 
As a result, li itself came to acquire a creative power, which Yulgok could not accept. 
Yulgok could only accept qi issuance in reality.  He said:
T’oegye based himself on these [words of Zhu Xi] and established a theory that 
said: ‘In the case of the Four Beginnings, principle gives issue and material force 
follows it; in the case of the Seven Feelings, material force gives issue and princi-
ple mounts it.’  What he says about material force giving issue and principle 
mounting it is permissible.  But this is not the case only with the Seven Feelings; 
the Four Beginnings are likewise a case of material force giving issue and princi-
ple mounting it.  What do I mean?  Only after seeing the child about to fall into 
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the well is there the issuance of feelings of commiseration.  Seeing it and feeling 
commiseration has to do with material force; this is what is described as material 
force giving issue.  The root of commiseration is humanity; this is what is de-
scribed as principle mounting it.56)
Yulgok’s intention becomes quite clear.  He attacked T’oegye’s theory of the alternat-
ing issuance of li, and accepted only the issuance of qi.  The Seven Feelings and the 
Four Beginnings are all human feelings.  The Four Beginnings mean that qi is issued 
from the basis of li.  Li, according to Yulgok, is the root of good feelings.  He claims 
that “li is non-active, and qi is active; qi issues, and li mounts it” (氣發理乘).57)  Accord-
ing to Julia Ching, “Yulgok has made a real contribution to Neo-Confucianism philos-
ophy, on an issue that Chinese thinkers have not settled clearly.  He has removed cer-
tain ambiguities present in Zhu Xi’s statements, especially regarding li and ch’i (氣, in 
Korean, ki ): that these are ‘two things,’ and yet must remain inseparable.  …  He has 
done so by emphasizing the role of ch’i.”58)  It is true that Zhu Xi’s li-qi theory is am-
biguous, but Yulgok clariﬁed and resolved this issue.  In this case, Yulgok can be said 
to depart from Zhu Xi’s inﬂuence because the initial ambiguity is a characteristic of 
Zhu Xi’s system, not Yulgok’s.  Thus it can be said that Yulgok’s li-qi theory was also 
destined to destabilize Zhu Xi’s system.
Yulgok does not end his argument here.  Instead, he continues his attack on 
T’oegye by separating the Four Seven Debate from the cosmological argument.  He 
wrote:
In Heaven and Earth, is there no mind for understanding (知覺)?  After a human 
body with vital energies (血氣) comes to exist, the mind for understanding comes 
to arise.  Because Heaven and Earth is a certain big vessel, it can enfold the myr-
iad of things.  Since it has no vital energies and no [potential] for understanding, 
it is impartial in its covering and supporting [the world].59)
The universe, Heaven and Earth, is different from a human being in that it has no 
mind.  The mind is a special attribute of human beings.  Those who have a physical 
body and vital energies can bear their own species; that is to say, they can only bear 
one of their own kind.  For example, a human being can only bear a human being, 
not a horse or a tiger.  This is possible only because they have a physical body.  Also, 
the mind comes to arise after they form the physical body.  Thus, if we say that Heav-
en and Earth have a mind, Heaven and Earth must have a physical body.  If Heaven 
and Earth have physical form, it cannot encompass the myriad of things.  Therefore 
Heaven and Earth cannot have a mind.  Since Heaven and Earth do not have a mind, 
which is the agent60) for knowing or mental processes, it is different from human be-
ings.  Here, Yulgok separates the argument about human beings from the cosmologi-
cal view.
4.  Conclusion and Questions
Pae Chong-ho concluded regarding the Four Seven Debate as follows:
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They (Choso˘n Neo-Confucian scholars) tried to inquire into the existence of hu-
man beings that characterizes the Four Beginnings-the Seven Feelings and insim-
tosim, which is a unique feature of Choso˘n Neo-Confucianism.  They tried to 
penetrate Heaven and human beings.  Therefore, understanding the human psy-
cho-mental function as the Four Beginnings—the Seven Feelings and insim-tosim, 
they tried to solve the metaphysical problems concerning its origin.  According-
ly, it was not a matter of analyzing the psycho-mental constitution or its process, 
but of explaining its origin, which, to (Choso˘n) Neo-Confucianism, concluded 
the argument of li and qi in the end.  Consequently, (Choso˘n) Neo-Confucian-
ism, with li-qi doctrine, aimed to penetrate Heaven and human beings, which 
also becomes a ﬁnal goal.  This means to connect ‘being’ (sein) of the nature with 
‘what it should be’ (sollen) of human beings.  Here (Choso˘n) Neo-Confucianism, 
appearing as both moral philosophy and natural philosophy, became concentrat-
ed on two questions, what it should be and what it is.  Later, scholars separated 
into the factions of qi principle (主氣), li principle (主理), and compromise (折衷) 
continued to argue.61)
The Four Seven Debate began under the major Neo-Confucian premise of “so˘ng is the 
same as li.”  They tried to solve the metaphysical problems about human psycho-men-
tal function by means of li-qi binary theory.  However, the debate had inherent prob-
lems in that it mixed the human realm with the cosmological realm.  T’oegye tried to 
provide a general basis for human morality using li and qi.  As a result, he conceptual-
ized li as having an active and creative power.  Precisely this point caused the Four 
Seven Debate in Choso˘n intellectual history.  However, Yulgok separated ethics from 
cosmology, and in doing so he denied li ’s activeness.  The universe is different from 
human beings mainly because it does not have a mind, which is the subject of human 
mental ability.  This intellectual development provided an important clue to the next 
unfolding of Neo-Confucianism in the Choso˘n period.62)
Since the mind of human beings is separated from Heaven and Earth, the next 
question lies in how a human being understands the universe.  Human beings should 
understand the universe with their own mental ability.  And, more importantly, the in-
clination of afﬁrming the positive character of qi eventually led to a reappraisal of Zhu 
Xi’s li-qi system.  In line with this, Hyegang might be positioned as the last scholar of 
this trend in Choso˘n intellectual history.
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